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Introduction and Highlights 
This project adapts and uses an existing set of models1 to provide an independent 
assessment of the potential impact of a range of policy interventions on poverty and 
inequality over the next decade or so.  
The Models 
A modelling framework was developed to enable the testing of a wide range of policy 
and contextual scenarios over a medium-to-longer term time horizon for the whole of 
the UK. This framework links a dynamic macro-simulation of demography, housing and 
labour markets at sub-regional scale with a micro-simulation to generate snapshots of 
poverty and related outcomes at household level. The main focus is on poverty 
outcomes for different groups, but the models also generate a wider set of outcomes, 
notably housing affordability, tenure and demographic change as well as inequality 
measures and some fiscal impacts. In other recent work the model has been used to 
                                                        
1 These models were originally developed for the Joseph Rowntree Foundation to support its Anti Poverty 
Strategy, published as Solve UK Poverty in Autumn 2016. The author was commissioned to undertake 
modelling work for that exercise alongside other commissioned research. The description and results of 
that modelling work were published in the report Bramley et al (2016) What Would Make a Difference: 
Modelling Policy Scenarios for Tackling Poverty in the UK. Readers interested in the detailed description 
of the background, rationale and detailed evidence based underlying this modelling work should refer to 
that report. All that is provided here is a summation of the basic approach, highlighting its strengths and 
some limitations. 
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develop new forecasts and scenarios for homelessness. We report mainly on impacts on 
a medium-longer term time horizon (2031 in this case), although the model can be used 
to look at earlier stages in the trajectory (or forward to 2041). 
For this specific application in Scotland, the model has been significantly adapted from 
that featuring in the 2016 report produced for Joseph Rowntree Foundation. The focus 
is mainly on Scotland and on the key child poverty targets at the time horizon of 2031. 
Each policy scenario is compared with a baseline representing ‘carrying on as we are’. 
This baseline has been modified relative to the 2016 version, both to bring it up to date 
and to sharpen the focus on Scotland.  
Scenarios were constructed that tested policy options under three main headings: 
 Social security, including features of Universal Credit and general levels of 
benefit 
 Work and wages, including minimum/living wage and interaction with taxes 
 Housing costs, including acting on these directly through regulation or tenure 
change, or indirectly through increasing supply. 
Outcome Measures 
The philosophy behind this study is that outcomes are what matter. In Appendix 1 we 
list all the outcomes which the model is capable of producing. However, the main focus 
in this study is on the four key targets set in Scotland in relation to child poverty. 
Low income relative poverty based on net equivalent income after housing costs 
(AHC) being less than 60% of UK median. 
Low income absolute poverty based on net equivalent income after housing costs 
(AHC) being less than 60% of UK median in 2011 in real terms. 
Persistent poverty based on having net equivalent income after housing costs (AHC) 
less than 60% of UK median in three of the last four years.  
‘Combined poverty’ based on having net equivalent income AHC less than 70% of UK 
median, and having predicted risk of lacking 4+essentials greater than 0.5.  
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Therefore, when we consider different policy options and scenarios, we report 
especially on their impact on these key indicators, and we show how far that particular 
scenario would go to eliminating each of the above aspects of poverty in Scotland by 
2031. We also comment on particular impacts of scenarios on a range of intermediate 
outcomes, especially in the housing field, as well as other aspects of poverty and 
inequality, particularly income inequality. In addition, partial estimates are made of the 
‘fiscal’ impact of each policy scenario on the public finances (tax revenues and public 
spending). 
The model shows outcomes across broad regions of England and countries of the UK. 
Within Scotland, patterns across different sub-regions are commented on as 
appropriate, but it is necessary to be cautious when drawing firm conclusions due to the 
small sample sizes in some of these areas.          
Scenarios 
Scenario 1: Higher Employment Rates 
This scenario was generated by raising the general parameters governing the medium-
longer term growth trend in GDP, reducing the extent of sub-regional variation in 
growth, and increasing the growth in Scotland specifically. The GDP growth averages 
2.26% for Scotland between 2016 and 2041, and 2.33% for UK in this scenario, 
compared with 1.90%% and 2.05% in the baseline respectively. It should be noted that 
this was accompanied by no increase in international migration. Although usually these 
variables are related, in the context of Brexit there is less likely to be such an upward 
movement in migration in response. The results of the ‘Stage 1 Model (i.e. SRHMM)’ are 
summarised in Table 1.  
Under this scenario real household income would be 4.5% higher by 2031, 
unemployment would be 30% lower and employment rates among working age adults 
would be 7.9% higher (5.5% points higher). House prices would be 4.1% higher, so 
affordability to buy would not have improved at 2031 although it would improve later 
(in this scenario, there is no general increase in housebuilding). Similarly rents would 
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be 4% higher, so there would not be much change in rental affordability. There would 
be a fall of 12% in backlog needs, and households in need would have a 22% higher 
chance of rehousing in the social sector.  
Table 1: Summary of Intermediate Outcomes from Sub-regional housing market 
model – Higher Employment Rates 
Scenario Outcomes Stage 1' SRHMM 
Higher Employment Rate   





    
Total New Housebuilding 0.9% -0.1% 
New Social Housebuilding 0.0% -0.4% 
Number of Households 0.0% -0.2% 
Household Growth -1.5% -1.1% 
   
Employment Rate wkg age 7.9% 3.3% 
Unemployment Rate -30.1% -19.3% 
Household Income 4.5% 2.0% 
   
Real House Price (median) 4.1% 1.4% 
Affordability to Buy -1.0% -0.2% 
Real Market Rent 4.0% 2.8% 
Affordability to Rent 0.2% -1.0% 
   
Share of Private Rented hhd -1.4% 0.4% 
Backlog Housing Need  -12.4% -4.1% 
Chance of Rehousing 22.0% 13.8% 
Using new elements added to the model2, we can report that this scenario would reduce 
‘core homelessness’3 in Scotland by 2,300 cases (15%) in 2031, compared with 13,600 
(6%) across UK. The greater proportionate impact in Scotland reflects the skewing of 
this scenario to give a greater economic improvement in Scotland. Core homelessness is 
quite a small group suffering extreme deprivation: of the poverty indicators reported 
below it relates most closely to ‘severe poverty’.  
                                                        
2 These new elements were added to the model as part of research for CRISIS on homelessness 
projections. 
3 ‘Core homelessness’ is a snapshot stock estimate of the number of households whose situation would be 
generally agreed to constitute homelessness, including rough sleeping and similar (e.g. cars, tents, public 
transport), unlicensed squatting, homeless hostels, unsuitable temporary accommodation (e.g. B&B), and 
‘sofa surfing’ i.e. concealed households staying with other than immediate family on short term basis and 
overcrowded (excluding students). 
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Poverty reduction outcomes against key targets for families with children in Scotland by 
2031 are summarised in Table 2. Taking the first key indicator, relative AHC poverty 
rate, this is forecast at 23.0% in 2031 in the baseline scenario, whereas this falls by 
2.1% points to 20.9% under this higher employment scenario. This represents 
‘progress’ which may be expressed as closing 16% of the gap between baseline forecast 
and target. Although the percentage point improvements are smaller for absolute 
poverty and combined poverty (income and material deprivation), these actually 
represent greater progress in closing these gaps. Put differently, for persistent poverty 
the numbers are smaller; but relative to the target, the improvement is larger.  
Table 2: Outcomes against key child poverty targets in Scotland from higher 
employment scenario, 2031 (families with children in Scotland only) 
Indicator Target Achieved Level Improvement Progress 
Relative Poverty 10.0% 20.9% -2.1% 16% 
Absolute Poverty 5.0% 11.7% -2.2% 25% 
Combined Poverty & 
Material 
Deprivation 5.0% 10.0% -2.0% 28% 
Persistent poverty  5.0% 8.0% -1.3% 31% 
The figures in Table 2 show this scenario would have a reasonable impact on the 
headline relative poverty rates, although there would be bigger impacts on the ‘fixed 
base’ Minimum Income Standard measures (down 15-16%), on severe poverty (down 
17%), and on children in workless households (down 13%). The poverty falls would be 
greater for families and other working age (down 9-11%) and slight for older 
households (down 2%). The decreases would be less in social renting than in other 
tenures. The largest proportionate poverty falls would appear to be in Aberdeen/shire, 
‘Central’ (Stirling-Falkirk-Clackmannan) and in Edinburgh-Lothian-Fife, with relatively 
less reduction in Ayrshire, Tayside and Greater Glasgow.  
For families in Scotland, the biggest absolute reductions in poverty would be for lone 
parent families, female-headed households, those living in social rented housing, and 
households with one worker. In terms of absolute and combined poverty, the biggest 
reductions would be for younger households (where the head of the household is aged 
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under 25), whereas for relative and persistent the biggest reductions would be for those 
aged 25-39.  
There is an apparent net positive fiscal impact of £3bn for (or rather, ‘in’) Scotland from 
the items counted. There are some indications of a slight improvement in equality, for 
example a fall in 90/10 ratio. This is obviously a generally positive scenario, but we are 
not saying how it can be achieved.  
Scenario 2: Full Living Wage  
This scenario attempts to compare full implementation of the Living Wage4 by 2020, 
plus a more generous approach to indexation thereafter: progressively raising the level 
(+1% per annum above median earnings). The scenario is compared to a base of the 
existing National Minimum Wage, not George Osborne’s ‘National Living Wage’ 
announced in 2015. The scenario makes allowance for the slight displacement of 
employment resulting from these measures, which is likely based on the findings of our 
previous research. Although allowance is made in the Stage 1 Sub Regional Housing 
Market Model for net impacts on employment and incomes, these are very slight and we 
do not dwell on them.  
Table 3 summarises the impact of this strategy on key child poverty targets. It can be 
seen that the impacts are rather small and, in one case, apparently perverse. The 
adverse impact on relative poverty implies that raising the minimum wage has a bigger 
impact on household incomes in the middle of the range (lifting the median) than it has 
on incomes of low income families with children. For example, many minimum wage 
workers are partners in two-worker households, while many others are single earners 
in small non-family households, including younger people. This is illustrated by the 
finding that relative poverty falls by 1.8% points for working age non-family 
households.  
                                                        
4 Information about the Living Wage can be found here: http://scottishlivingwage.org/.  
  Policy Scotland | March 2018 
7 
 
Table 3: Outcomes against key child poverty targets in Scotland from full living 
wage scenario, 2031 (families with children in Scotland only) 
Indicator Target 
Achieved 
Level Improvement Progress 
Relative Poverty 
10.0% 23.6% 0.6% -5% 
Absolute Poverty 5.0% 13.7% -0.3% 3% 
Combined Poverty & Material 
Deprivation 5.0% 11.5% -0.5% 7% 
Persistent poverty  
5.0% 9.3% 0.0% 1% 
In this respect Scotland is slightly less favoured than England, particularly the Midlands. 
There are slightly bigger impacts on fixed base Minimum Income Standard measures. 
The poverty reductions are concentrated in the renting tenures, with owner-occupiers 
worse off, partly perhaps because it is working age non-family households which mainly 
benefit, with older households losing out in relative poverty terms.  
This scenario would appear to offer a massive fiscal boost of £15bn for UK by 2031, 
from reduced UC payouts and increased IT and NIC receipts, but only £500m of this 
would be in Scotland. The impacts on inequality appear slight. 
Clearly, while we can simulate the changes between the pre-existing National Minimum 
Wage (NMW) and the 2015-announced ‘National Living Wage’, as well as separating the 
effects of post 2021 indexation, it is clear that all of these component effects on child 
poverty will be even smaller.  
Scenario 3: Raise Tax Allowance  
We test here the option of raising the personal tax allowance by 20% (£2,500 in 2013), 
while allowing the higher rate threshold to be knocked upwards by the same absolute 
amount. This appears to have negligible effects on poverty measures for Scotland, 
although slightly improving things for families and working age versus older 
households. The picture is a bit more favourable in England, but with still relatively 
small changes. This measure appears to have a high fiscal cost (£25bn in UK and £2.4bn 
in Scotland by 2031) for little benefit in terms of poverty or inequality.  
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There are some caveats attached to the testing of this scenario. Firstly, we may not have 
tested exactly the preferred version of that (e.g. leaving the upper rate threshold fixed, 
so narrowing the standard rate band), and we have not allowed for any behavioural 
responses, in terms of work participation, which may be unduly conservative. 
Furthermore, due to the limited time and resources available for this report, this model 
does not test the revised income tax rate structure introduced by the Scottish 
Government in its most recent budget.  
However, from the testing of this scenario it can be seen that the changes will have a 
minimal direct impact on poverty. The maximum gain to a low paid (e.g. minimum 
wage) person working full time from the new lower rate starting band would be £20 per 
annum (40p per week), or 0.15% of their net income. The other changes to bands and 
rates could overall have some impact on wider measures of income distribution.  
Scenario 4: Raise General Housing Supply  
There are several ways to reduce housing costs. In this scenario, we get the planning 
system to release a lot more land for housing so stimulating a large increase in private 
housebuilding, and a moderate accompanying rise in social housing construction. The 
model allows for the consequent impact of housebuilding activity on employment levels 
(based on the findings of the Lyons Inquiry into Local Government in 20075). Total new 
build is increased by up to a third across the UK, but the net increase in Scotland in the 
period to 2031 is less: 15%. This is intended to reduce housing costs, and the model 
indicates that median house prices would be 6% lower across the UK at 2031, although 
only 3.4% lower in Scotland. A UK-wide increase of this order would cause by far the 
biggest impact in London. With modest improvements in employment/incomes as well, 
affordability to buy would improve by 9% in the UK but only 4.1% in Scotland. Market 
rents would be 3% lower in UK and 2% lower in Scotland, with corresponding modest 
improvements in rental affordability. The share of private renting tenure would be little 
changed, implying no great recovery in homeownership rates.  
                                                        
5 The full findings of the Lyons Inquiry into Local Government can be read here: 
http://www.lyonsinquiry.org.uk/.  
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Under this scenario core homelessness would fall by 1,100 (7%) in Scotland in 2031, 
compared with 22,000 (10%) across UK. 
Table 4: Impact of increase in general housing supply across Scotland and 
England 
Scenario outcomes Stage 1' SRHMM 
 Proportional change from  Scotland UK 
 baseline, % 2031 2031 
Total New Housebuilding* 15.4% 26.7% 
New Social Housebuilding* 5.9% 15.7% 
Number of Households 1.6% 1.8% 
Household Growth 18.3% 19.8% 
   Employment Rate wkg age -0.1% 0.6% 
Unemployment Rate -0.4% -3.7% 
Household Income 0.3% 0.4% 
   Real House Price (median) -3.4% -6.0% 
Affordability to Buy 4.1% 9.0% 
Real Market Rent -1.9% -2.9% 
Affordability to Rent 1.9% 3.1% 
   Share of Private Rented hhd 0.1% 1.0% 
Backlog Housing Need  -2.8% -5.0% 
Chance of Rehousing 6.5% 17.5% 
* this averaged over whole period to 2031 
 
It is important to note that increased housebuilding on this scale would lead to more 
households forming, with household numbers up by 1.6% in Scotland at 2031 (1.8% UK, 
and household growth rates 18% higher (20% UK). The model includes endogenous 
econometric functions to predict household formation and internal gross migration 
flows by broad age groups. These were calibrated on data mainly from the 1990s and 
early 2000s (BHPS and ONS Local Migration statistics). The relationships within these 
models reflect a wider literature on the economic, housing and other influences on 
these ‘demographic’ processes, as reviewed in Bramley & Watkins (2016). 
People in housing need would have a better chance of rehousing in the social sector in 
2031, but only by 7% in Scotland compared with 18% across the UK. Core homelessness 
in Scotland would fall by around 1,000 households or 7% in 2026 and 2031 and by a 
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greater degree further into the future. The fall across Great Britain would be greater at 
10% in 2031.  
This scenario has small impacts on poverty, in particular on relative low income and 
particularly in Scotland (BHC -1.0%, AHC +0.8%). Table 5 shows that there would be 
only a very slight improvement in absolute, combined and persistent poverty for 
families in Scotland. There is a slightly more favourable impact on poverty measures 
across the UK, particularly in London, with relatively more impact on severe poverty 
and housing need. There is not much difference in the poverty impacts between 
household types.  
Table 5: Outcomes against key child poverty targets in Scotland from increased 
general housing supply scenario, 2031 (families with children in Scotland only) 
Indicator Target Achieved Level Improvement Progress 
Relative Poverty 10.0% 23.0% 0.0% 0% 
Absolute Poverty 5.0% 13.8% -0.2% 2% 
Combined Poverty & Material 
Deprivation 5.0% 11.9% -0.1% 1% 
Persistent poverty  
5.0% 9.3% 0.0% 1% 
 
There is apparent a net fiscal benefit of £2bn across UK, mainly from reduced Universal 
Credit payouts, but this is only £130m for Scotland. This does not take account of 
possible public spending impacts associated with enabling additional land to be 
developed. Impacts on inequality appear slight.  
Scenario 5: Reduce the scale of the private rented 
sector through regulation and taxation 
This scenario is another approach to reducing housing costs, and may already be in 
train, particularly in Scotland with the new tenancy legislation combined with the effect 
of UK wide tax measures. It recognises the key role of having a much larger private 
rented sector with a wider spectrum of households having to use it, where the general 
level of rents is much higher and the coverage of Housing Benefit/ Local Housing 
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Allowance/ Universal Credit is less complete. Therefore this is another way of reducing 
housing costs, but it may also achieve other goals e.g. better standards, more home-
ownership aspirations realised, and so on. The modelling implies and assumes a 
lower/flat level of buy-to-let investment in the future, and the application of European-
style ‘second generation’ rent regulation within tenancies for existing tenants (but with 
rent rises limited below inflation).  
The model suggests that this package could reduce house prices substantially, by 
around 17% by 20316, leading to a large improvement in affordability to buy of 43% in 
Scotland and 27% in the UK, with some improvement in affordability to rent (7%) and 
some reduction in the share of private renting (2.5% down in Scotland). Backlog needs 
would fall by 11% and the chances of rehousing for those in need would rise by 21% in 
Scotland (and UK) by 2031. Core homelessness would fall by 1,300 or 8% in Scotland in 
2031 (9,000 or 4% across UK).  
Table 6: Impact of Increase in re-regulation of private rented sector across 
Scotland and Great Britain 
SUMMARY OUTCOMES Stage 1' SRHMM 
PRS re-regulation 
  Proportional change from  Scotland UK 
 baseline, % 2031 2031 
Total New Housebuilding 0.9% -0.4% 
New Social Housebuilding 0.6% 0.1% 
Number of Households 0.5% 0.5% 
Household Growth 3.7% 4.0% 
   Employment Rate wkg age -0.1% 0.0% 
Unemployment Rate 0.5% 0.1% 
Household Income -0.2% -0.1% 
   Real House Price (median) -17.3% -17.1% 
Affordability to Buy 22.3% 26.7% 
Real Market Rent -0.9% -0.4% 
Affordability to Rent 5.6% 5.8% 
   Share of Private Rented hhd -3.1% -1.1% 
Backlog Housing Need  -7.0% -7.4% 
Chance of Rehousing 13.6% 18.6% 
                                                        
6 This impact does look quite high, and reflects fairly high sensitivity to the buy-to-let investment variable. 
We may wish to consider a somewhat modified assumption about this, having regard to any evidence of 
the effects of the tax and regulatory changes so far.  




The effects of this scenario on poverty seem a bit perverse in one respect, with relative 
low income poverty AHC increasing slightly in Scotland, although it falls marginally 
across the UK. However, there are more favourable changes in Minimum Income 
Standard Gap and severe poverty measures, as well as in indicators of financial difficulty 
and housing needs. As with many strategies, poverty improves somewhat for families 
and working age while deteriorating somewhat for older households. Table 7 focuses on 
the impacts on core child poverty targets for families with children in Scotland. This 
indicates a bit of progress on absolute and persistent poverty.  
Table 7. Impact of private renting re-regulation on child poverty target 
indicators for families in Scotland 
Indicator Target Achieved Level Improvement Progress 
Relative Poverty 10.0% 23.0% -0.1% 0% 
Absolute Poverty 5.0% 13.0% -1.0% 11% 
Combined Poverty & Material 
Deprivation 5.0% 11.9% -0.1% 1% 
Persistent poverty  
5.0% 9.2% -0.2% 5% 
There is a modest net fiscal benefit across UK of £0.9bn, but the change for Scotland is 
negligible. The distributional impacts seem negligible.  
Scenario 6: Build significantly more social housing 
This appears to be currently a popular suggestion in the policy world, as another route 
to reducing housing costs and as a more direct way of boosting overall housing supply 
as well as raising standards. However, there are clearly widely differing views on the 
future role of social housing and related issues like tenure security, rent levels and 
rights to buy. This scenario involves a substantial level of total enhancement to new 
build but with a much larger element of social housing in the mix7. The (revised) version 
                                                        
7 The model determines social housing numbers based on two parameters, proportion of past 
completions and proportion of private sector new build. The latter linkage makes sense given the 
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of this strategy delivers 7,000 social housing units per year (and around 10,000 
‘affordable), which is 140% above the baseline level, in a context of 40% increased 
private housebuilding, and similar increases in England. The geographical profile of this 
extra social housing is slightly shifted towards areas with higher net needs for more 
social housing (but could be shifted further).  
This scenario (like the general supply one) increases household numbers (by 1.7% in 
Scotland by 2031) and household growth (by 22% in Scotland and 29% in the UK). This 
effect is one of the reasons why the impacts on household level poverty measures are 
less positive than some might expect. However, it would lead to lower unemployment, 
and slightly higher incomes, as well as lower house prices (-8% in Scotland, -12% in the 
UK), improved access to home ownership (20% more younger households could buy in 
Scotland), lower market rents (-5%) and improved rental affordability (7% more could 
afford market rents). This scenario would achieve small fall in the share of the private 
rented sector in Scotland (-1%). 
Backlog housing need would fall by 7%, while core homelessness would fall by around 
15% (2,250). It is much easier to pre-empt or prevent homelessness, or nip it quickly in 
the bud, if you have a generous supply of social rented lettings. There would be a large 
increase in both relets and new lets, so that the chances of a household in need getting 
into social housing would rise by 61% in Scotland.  
  
                                                                                                                                                                            
importance nowadays of s.106/75 planning agreements and ‘inclusionary housing’ policies. The housing 
supply econometric model also indicates positive effects from more social housing completions on private 
sector completions. Therefore you tend to have more private housing as well, if you want more social 
housing. These parameters are currently tuned to yield total social housebuilding of 7,000 pa in this 
scenario, which is the current Scottish Government target, and about 140% above baseline.  
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Table 8: Impact of Increase in social housing supply across Scotland and Great 
Britain on housing and labour markets 
SUMMARY OUTCOMES Stage 1' SRHMM 
consistent with SG targets 
 Proportional change from  Scotland UK 
 baseline, % 2031 2031 
Total New Housebuilding* 35.1% 41.7% 
New Social Housebuilding* 80.7% 110.9% 
Number of Households 2.5% 2.8% 
Household Growth 28.4% 27.8% 
   Employment Rate wkg age -0.2% 0.6% 
Unemployment Rate -0.1% -3.7% 
Household Income 0.1% 0.5% 
   Real House Price (median) -6.6% -11.0% 
Affordability to Buy 6.8% 15.5% 
Real Market Rent -3.7% -5.4% 
Affordability to Rent 2.9% 5.3% 
   Share of Private Rented 
hhd -5.6% -1.4% 
Backlog Housing Need  -5.3% -7.8% 
Chance of Rehousing 20.0% 59.3% 
* this averaged over whole period to 2031 
Again, this scenario appears to have a slight perverse effect on some measures of 
poverty in Scotland, with relative low income AHC rising by 1.3%), although some 
measures (Minimum Income Standard, and housing needs) improve. The impacts on 
poverty are more favourable in England, especially in London. The impacts on the 
specific child poverty targets for families in Scotland are shown in Table 9. 
Table 9: Impact of increase in social housing supply on child poverty target 
indicators for families in Scotland 
Indicator Target Achieved Level Improvement Progress 
Relative Poverty 10.0% 23.2% 0.2% -1% 
Absolute Poverty 5.0% 13.5% -0.5% 5% 
Combined Poverty & Material Deprivation 
5.0% 12.2% 0.2% -3% 
Persistent poverty  
5.0% 9.4% 0.1% -1% 
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Only for one target, absolute poverty, is there progress, and even this is relatively small 
in magnitude.  
Similar findings were reported and discussed in the Joseph Rowntree Foundation Anti-
Poverty Strategy work. It is suggested that these apparently perverse findings reflect at 
least four factors: (1) reduced housing costs impact on a broad spectrum of households, 
particularly those around the median, while for the poorest households these changes 
are often offset by changes in UC entitlement; (2) the significant tendency of additional 
social housing supply to induce additional household formation by people who are 
economically marginal; (3) the possibility that in some regions, including significant 
parts of Scotland, there is ‘enough’ (social) housing and building a lot more may be 
counterproductive (unlike the situation in London); (4) a limitation of the model, 
whereby, although we attempt through simulating tenure-switching at individual level 
to change the mix of households within tenures, social renting is still essentially 
characterised as a tenure of the poor.  
This scenario appears to entail a net fiscal cost, most obviously because of the additional 
capital grant costs of the social housing programme, but also because savings in 
Universal Credit housing payments are not sufficient to offset a loss of tax and NICs. 
Again, distributional effects do not appear to be large.  
Scenario 7: Benefit Takeup  
This scenario envisages a reduction in unclaimed benefits in the means tested sector, 
mainly Universal Credit and equivalent for older households. Baseline levels of non-
takeup comparable to those associated with existing comparable benefits (see 
Department for Work and Pensions 2017) are applied randomly to groups at greater 
risk of non-takeup. In this scenario (TK) we halve the incidence of these.  
The summary impacts on poverty measures appear to suggest that this scenario would 
make only a small difference to poverty overall, with a 1.7% reduction in relative low 
income AHC in Scotland compared with 0.7% reduction in the UK. Within that general 
picture, marginal beneficiary groups in Scotland would include: private renters (-4.7%) 
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and owners (-2.9%), rather than social renters; working age nonfamily households (-
2.8%); and geographically in Ayrshire and the central belt. 
The specific impacts on families with children are even more limited as shown in Table 
10. Again, these positive impacts are mainly in private renting and for smaller, younger 
working families.  
Table 10: Impact of halving in take-up of means tested benefits on child poverty 
target indicators for families in Scotland 
Indicator Target Achieved Level Improvement Progress 
Relative Poverty 10.0% 22.8% -0.2% 2% 
Absolute Poverty 5.0% 13.8% -0.1% 1% 
Combined Poverty & Material 
Deprivation 5.0% 12.0% 0.0% 0% 
Persistent poverty  5.0% 9.3% 0.0% 1% 
 
There would however be a net fiscal cost of £2.3bn UK-wide or £170m in Scotland. This 
does not take account of any extra costs in grant aid to Citizens Advice Bureau, Money 
Advice etc. Again, the income distribution effects are negligible.  
These rather muted findings suggest that non-takeup (as modelled, but based on 
evidence) is often correlated with not being below the thresholds of poverty. For 
example, many older people do not take up all of their entitlements, but nevertheless 
they tend not to be below the poverty threshold. People entitled to partial benefit are 
more likely not to claim, as are private renters. However, this approach has slightly 
more mileage in Scotland than UK-wide. 
Scenario 8: Universal Credit personal allowances  
The most basic and direct way to help the poor is to give them more money, and the 
main vehicle to do this now and in future is through Universal Credit, which subsumes 
most former means tested benefits, housing benefits and tax credits. Since our baseline 
includes the cuts announced by George Osborne in the 2015 Summer Budget, the first 
thing we can do is to reverse those. Secondly, we can increase the personal allowances 
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substantially (by 30%). Thirdly, we can remove the total benefit cap8. And finally we can 
index Universal Credit in future to average earnings rather than the baseline long run 
assumption of 1% under earnings. So this should be understood as something of a 
package rather than one very specific measure. The scenario as presented here does not 
assume significant resulting behavioural change, in either the housing or the labour 
markets. It should be noted that, while a lot of Universal Credit goes to households out 
of work, it is combined with the former ‘tax credits’ which were targeted at in work 
poverty – so this scenario does not exactly map on to the suggested topic of ‘increase 
out of work benefits’. 
Unsurprisingly this package makes quite a dent in poverty by 2031. The key headline 
indicator (relative low income AHC) falls by 7.3% in Scotland with an 11% fall for 
families with children. The impact is greater on the Minimum Income Standard Gap 
measure (16%), while ‘severe poverty’ would be reduced by 36%. The biggest poverty 
reductions are in the rental tenures, particularly private renting (-13% AHC), with 
owner occupation not reducing. While families see a larger reduction (11%) than other 
working age (8%), again older households see a marginal increase in poverty.  
Table 11 sets out how this package would contribute substantially towards approaching 
the child poverty targets. It would close one-fifth of the gap on relative poverty, but 
approaching two-fifths in relation to persistent poverty, and a third in relation to 
absolute poverty.  
  
                                                        
8 On reflection, and ideally, we would also remove the two-child limit in Universal Credit – currently this 
is hardwired rather than a controllable parameter so is deferred to a later test.  
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Table 11: Impact of reversing 2015 cuts in personal allowances in Universal 
Credit, raising rates by 30%, lifting benefit cap and indexing on earnings on child 
poverty target indicators for families in Scotland by 2031 
Indicator Target 
Achieved 
Level Improvement Progress 
Relative Poverty 10.0% 20.5% -2.6% 20% 
Absolute Poverty 5.0% 10.7% -3.2% 36% 
Combined Poverty & Material 
Deprivation 5.0% 10.8% -1.2% 18% 
Persistent poverty  5.0% 7.9% -1.4% 32% 
Among families, the largest absolute gains would go to lone parent and larger families, 
the groups with higher incidence of poverty. Private renters would see the biggest 
reduction in relative poverty but social renters would see the larger reductions in 
absolute and combined poverty. Reductions would be greatest for non-working family 
households of working age, female headed families, and younger adults (under -25s). 
Geographically, the largest reductions in most indicators would be in Tayside, but 
absolute poverty would fall more in Clydeside and Central regions.  
Also unsurprisingly, this package would come with quite a big fiscal price tag, around 
£21bn in net terms across UK, of which about £1.5bn falls in Scotland. All the indicators 
of inequality would improve under this scenario. 
Scenario 9: Universal Credit work allowances  
The Universal Credit work allowances are like the former earnings disregards in the 
Housing Benefit system, but as originally designed much more generous. Their aim was 
to encourage more people to participate more fully in the labour market, through the 
basic economic incentive of not seeing one’s benefit income immediately taken away as 
one starts to work or increases hours of work. While that was the original billing, among 
the cuts announced in the 2015 Summer Budget were substantial reductions in the 
work allowances, weakening the claims of Universal Credit to be a system which made 
work worthwhile. The scenario tested here is, again, to reverse the 2015 cuts but then 
to increase the allowances substantially beyond that (by 30%, again).  
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It is assumed this time that there is a significant behavioural response. We made some 
attempts to model (a) the marginal effects of tax/benefit changes on ‘work incentives’, 
and (b) to estimate how much labour force participation might respond to this, using 
our UKHLS database. However, these attempts were not wholly successful and only 
scratch the surface of what has been a major focus of economic research. Essentially, the 
changes in work participation are plausible, and are based on some evidence, but 
cannot be said to be finely calibrated to particular features of the benefit change. In this 
instance we assume the effect is on people changing from non-working to working 
status, rather than existing workers increasing their hours.  
Overall, with these caveats, this measure appears to have large positive effects in terms 
of reducing poverty, particularly for families in Scotland. As Table 12 shows, the 
headline relative poverty rate would fall by 3.9% points, which is a 17% fall and which 
takes it 30% of the way to the target level. This impact is bigger than that seen for 
families across the UK (an 8% fall). This may imply that there is more effective capacity 
for increased employment in Scotland, which also seemed to be reflected in our first 
scenario. This particular measure also achieves good progress towards the absolute 
poverty target, and goes some way towards the persistent poverty target, while having 
less impact on combined poverty. This particular policy measure seems to impact more 
on relative poverty. 
Table 12: Impact of reversing 2015 cuts in work allowances in Universal Credit, 
and raising these by a further 30%, on child poverty target indicators for 
families in Scotland by 2031 
Indicator Target Achieved Level Improvement Progress 
Relative Poverty 10.0% 19.2% -3.9% 30% 
Absolute Poverty 5.0% 11.2% -2.7% 31% 
Combined Poverty & Material 
Deprivation 5.0% 11.7% -0.3% 4% 
Persistent poverty  5.0% 8.6% -0.7% 17% 
All tenures benefit but social renters gain most in terms of the first two measures, with 
private renters doing relatively better on the other two measures. Families benefit more 
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than other household types, particularly lone parent families. Geographically, however, 
the largest gains seem to be in Ayrshire and Tayside. 
Whereas the previous strategy would cost a lot in extra public spending, this one 
appears to be close to fiscally neutral, as extra employment (generating tax, NICs, and 
smaller UC claims) offsets the higher payouts to households whose status does not 
change. This strategy also offers moderate improvements in inequality measures.  
The fiscal impacts in particular suggest that this strategy should be combined with the 
previous one, as well as with the first one, to make for a more balanced and affordable 
approach. There is also an argument that these levels of additional workforce 
participation would be more likely to be achieved, if improved (flexible and affordable) 
childcare arrangements were in place.  
Scenario 10: Universal Credit taper  
The test performed here is similar to that above, insofar as similar (but somewhat 
lesser) changes in employment participation are assumed to take place. However, the 
impacts on incomes and poverty levels still differ, and in general are rather smaller. 
Headline relative child poverty in Scotland is reduced by 1.4% points (7% reduction) 
which is slightly more than the UK. There is reasonable progress on both relative and 
absolute poverty towards the target levels, but combined and persistent poverty see 
little movement.  
Table 13: Impact of reducing Universal Credit taper to 50% on child poverty 
target indicators for families in Scotland by 2031 
Indicator Target Achieved Level Improvement Progress 
Relative Poverty 10.0% 21.5% -1.5% 11% 




Deprivation 5.0% 11.9% 0.0% 1% 
Persistent 
poverty  5.0% 9.3% 0.0% 1% 
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Private renters gain most on relative poverty, but social renters gain more in terms of 
absolute poverty reduction. As in most of the other scenarios tested, families and 
working age households gain while older households see poverty rise slightly. The 
geographical pattern shows gains in relative child poverty in Ayrshire and 
Edinburgh/Fife/Lothian particularly, with more reduction in absolute poverty in 
Tayside.  
The fiscal impacts appear slightly more favourable than the previous strategy, with a 
gain of £2.6bn across UK but a net cost of £250m in Scotland. The distributional effects 
are similar to the previous case, but slightly less good.  
Scenario 11: Working hours  
One of the ways in which household incomes can be enhanced and their distribution 
changed is if household members who currently work part-time were to increase their 
hours. Part of the structuring of Universal Credit and conditionality rules is to 
encourage people to work longer hours, and one of the criticisms of the current UK 
labour market is the large number of people who are working in jobs which are rather 
marginal in terms of hours as well as in terms of job security and employment 
conditions – terms such as underemployment, exclusionary employment and precarity 
have been variously used (Standing, 2011, Bailey, 2018).  
This particular simulation is similar to that applied in relation to workforce 
participation, whereby a random selection of those categories of currently part-time 
workers see a substantial rise in their hours (extra 16 hours). No specific mechanisms 
are invoked to make this happen but it is assumed to follow from the structuring of the 
welfare system and a continued strong labour market demand. Figure 13 shows the 
impact on key child poverty target indicators for Scotland. It seems that this would 
make a consistently useful contribution in moving towards targets on all of these 
indicators, closing the gap by about 10% and reducing relative poverty by 5% (1.2% 
points).  
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Table 14: Impact of increasing working hours for part-time workers on child 
poverty target indicators for families in Scotland by 2031 
Indicator Target Achieved Level Improvement Progress 
Relative Poverty 10.0% 21.8% -1.2% 9% 
Absolute Poverty 5.0% 13.5% -0.4% 5% 
Combined Poverty & 
Material Deprivation 5.0% 11.3% -0.7% 10% 
Persistent poverty  5.0% 8.9% -0.5% 11% 
 
Scotland seems to gain more from this strategy than the UK as a whole, particularly for 
families. Gains would be greater for couples with 1-2 children, for older households, and 
for households with one worker. Gains would be spread across the tenures but would 
be larger in absolute terms for social renters.  
This scenario appears to offer a large fiscal boost, of the order of £21bn across UK or 
£1.8bn in Scotland. It has no overt costs and leads to falls in Universal Credit claims and 
rises in tax and National Insurance receipts. This seems almost too much of a free good, 
and it can be argued that such a scenario would be more likely to be realised, with less 
adverse social costs, if there was a substantial accompanying enhancement of childcare 
provision (including flexibility and quality as argued for in Butler and Rutter, 2016) as 
well as other support for carers/caring. Therefore we report another scenario below 
including these elements.  
Scenario 12: Enhanced Childcare alongside 
Workforce Participation and Hours (CC) 
Following on from the preceding scenarios, I have therefore re-run a scenario 
developed as part of the JRF 2016 study, entailing the implementation of a 
comprehensive, flexible child care package as recommended in the report to JRF by 
Butler & Rutter (2016) – see also Bramley et al (2016, pp.71-4) for further details. 
Within the latter report, this childcare package emerged as one of the most favourable 
overall scenarios for reducing poverty, and this point was picked up in some of the 
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media coverage, particularly in Scotland in later 2016. This scenario entails similar 
increases in workforce participation and working hours and is associated with a 0.25% 
increase in the GVA growth rate during the 2020s, which also thus gives some overlap 
with the ‘regional growth’/higher employment scenario considered earlier.  
We focus here on the impacts on child poverty, while recognising that this strategy 
offers considerable wider benefits to the economy and society in the longer term, for 
example through improved educational attainment. Table 15 presents the impacts on 
the key child poverty targets in standard form. This scenario is particularly impressive 
in terms of its achievements in reducing combined poverty and material deprivation 
and persistent poverty, as well as closing a third of the gap on absolute poverty and one-
sixth of the gap in relative poverty. 
Table 15: Impact of increasing working hours for part-time workers on child 
poverty target indicators for families in Scotland by 2031 
Indicator Target Achieved Level Improvement Progress 
Relative Poverty 10.0% 20.9% -2.1% 16% 
Absolute Poverty 5.0% 11.0% -3.0% 33% 
Combined Poverty & 
Material Deprivation 5.0% 8.0% -4.0% 57% 
Persistent poverty  5.0% 6.6% -2.8% 64% 
Lone parents and larger families see some of the bigger gains, as do social renters, 
formerly workless households and younger family households. The largest absolute 
improvements appear to be in Ayrshire and in Edinburgh/Lothian/Fife.  
We also calculate additional, more specific, indicators. In this scenario, poverty after 
housing and childcare costs would fall by 2.7% points (12%) for families in Scotland. 
The ‘MISGap’ (average shortfall in net income after housing and childcare costs relative 
to Minimum Income Standard) for families would fall by £9.62 per week (30%). The 
proportion of children in workless households would fall by 7.9% points (46%). These 
are clearly also impressive achievements.  
Our estimates suggest that this scenario would have a net positive fiscal impact of 
£12bn across the UK but only £0.7bn in Scotland. The additional tax and NI, and reduced 
  Policy Scotland | March 2018 
24 
 
Universal Credit claims, from higher employment participation and hours would 
outweigh the substantial cost of the additional childcare package. The income 
distribution effects are somewhat positive, and similar to those of the previous scenario.  
Scenario 13: Local Housing Allowance Freeze (HA) 
We were asked to consider options which would increase support with housing costs. 
Since support with housing costs are increasingly now merged into Universal Credit, in 
a sense the scenarios dealing with Universal Credit (already reported) are the main 
route to varying the generosity of such support. However, the issue of what housing 
costs ‘count’ for Universal Credit is important.  
One of the welfare reform/austerity measures introduced since 2011 which has been 
causing increased concern, particularly in the housing field, is the reduction and then 
freezing of the Local Housing Allowance (LHA) rates for private rents eligible for 
subsidy through the Housing Benefit and now the Universal Credit system. The initial 
reduction was from the median to the thirtieth percentile of private market rents in 
each Broad Market Area across the UK. This was then indexed at a very low rate of 
increase (1% per annum) for a couple of years, and then subsequently frozen. Thus 
gradually over time with the effects of general inflation and upward movement in 
private market rents, there is a growing gap between what private renters actually pay 
and what the Housing Benefit/Universal Credit system will cover. This reduces after 
housing cost income and so increases the risk of poverty for private renters.  
This policy also has created more pressing problems in the homelessness sector. It has 
been a key factor in the steeply rising number and proportion of households applying to 
local authorities as homeless due to the loss of an assured shorthold tenancy, or the 
inability to access such a tenancy. In addition it has frustrated local authority attempts 
to prevent homelessness or discharge their duties to homeless households by securing 
them a tenancy in the private rented sector, because of the increasingly unaffordable 
rent gap. Evidence for these problems is rehearsed in the regular Homelessness Monitor 
series (Fitzpatrick et al 2017) and in Bramley’s (2017) work on forecasting and 
projecting homeless numbers. In addition the recent (2017) National Audit Office and 
Public Accounts Committee inquiries into homelessness highlighted this issue.  
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Because the Local Housing Allowance freeze is not included in the baseline scenario we 
model it as an additional policy variant, but this time it tends to increase poverty rather 
than reduce it. We initially tested the effects of the freeze lasting until 2021. At UK level 
this leads to a 1.7% increase in AHC relative poverty, a 3.1% increase in combined 
poverty and 5.8% increase in severe poverty (the greater sensitivity of severe poverty 
would chime with the sensitivity of homelessness already alluded to). These adverse 
changes are wholly concentrated in the private rented sector, where the AHC poverty 
increase is 5% across the UK. However, the effects of this policy in Scotland appear to be 
negligible, presumably due to the lower level of, and increase in, private rents, so we do 
not report this particular variant in more detail.  
I then tested a stronger variant of this, where Local Housing Allowance is frozen for a 
further decade, which effectively knocks a further 21% off the level of rent subsidized 
by 2031. This raises the scale of the impacts UK-wide, with some modest effect in 
Scotland e.g. 4% higher AHC poverty among private renters. However, mostly these 
impacts seem to fall on non-family working age households, with the impacts on 
families still relatively slight. This can be seen in Table 16, where the negative impacts 
on progress towards key targets are relatively slight.  
Table 16: Impact of extended LHA freeze on child poverty target indicators for 
families in Scotland by 2031 
Indicator Target Achieved Level Improvement Progress 
Relative Poverty 10.0% 23.1% 0.1% -1% 
Absolute Poverty 5.0% 14.4% 0.4% -5% 
Combined Poverty 
& Material 
Deprivation 5.0% 11.9% -0.1% 1% 
Persistent poverty  5.0% 9.4% 0.0% 0% 
This particular policy therefore seems not to have very much bite in Scotland, because 
of a combination of the less pressured housing market and the greater role of social 
renting rather than private renting for families.  
The extended LHA freeze could have a substantial positive fiscal effect, worth £7.7bn 
across UK in 2031, although Scotland’s share of this is small (£140m). These fiscal 
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savings are of course the reason why the UK government has been keen to freeze this 
allowance. 
Scenario 14: Combined Favourable Scenario (CF) 
The final scenario exemplified is one where we combine all of the elements which were 
shown separately above to make a significant contribution towards reducing child 
poverty in Scotland. These include: the higher and more regionally even levels of 
economic growth and employment; higher levels of total and especially social housing 
new build supply; greater regulation of private rented sector (curbing rent rises within 
tenancies, less tax breaks for buy to let); full living wage; indexation of living wage and 
benefits to 1% above earnings; restoration of 2015 cuts in Universal Credit; raising 
personal and work allowances in Universal Credit by 30%; reducing the Universal 
Credit taper to 50%; ending the Local Housing Allowance freeze; halving of non-takeup 
of means tested benefits; and a generous enhanced childcare package.  
Table 17 summarises intermediate outcomes achieved by this combined scenario in the 
labour and housing markets of Scotland and the UK. Total new housebuilding rises by 
approaching 40% while social housebuilding nearly doubles. This scenario would see a 
significant increase in household growth (up more than a third), indicating that a lot 
more younger adults feel able to form separate households sooner. The employment 
rate of working age people in Scotland would rise by 10%, a much bigger gain than in 
England, while the unemployment rate would fall by 42%, and household incomes 
would be over 6% higher in 2031. At the same time house prices would be 22% lower 
and the proportion of younger households able to afford to buy would rise by more than 
a third. Rental affordability would improve more moderately (by 12%), but 13% less 
households would have to live in the private rented sector. Backlog housing needs 
would fall by 30% and the chances of a household in need getting access to social 
housing would double. 
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Table 17: Summary of Intermediate Outcomes from Sub-regional housing 
market model – Combined Favourable Scenario 
SUMMARY OUTCOMES Stage 1' SRHMM 
   Proportional change from  Scotland UK 
 baseline, % 2031 2031 
Total New Housebuilding* 37.5% 41.3% 
New Social Housebuilding* 85.3% 107.9% 
Number of Households 3.5% 3.4% 
Household Growth 37.8% 34.2% 
   Employment Rate wkg age 10.8% 3.8% 
Unemployment Rate -41.6% -21.4% 
Household Income 6.4% 2.4% 
   Real House Price (median) -22.2% -25.3% 
Affordability to Buy 35.8% 44.0% 
Real Market Rent -0.8% -3.3% 
Affordability to Rent 11.6% 10.7% 
   Share of Private Rented hhd -12.5% -2.5% 
Backlog Housing Need  -29.5% -17.9% 
Chance of Rehousing 101.1% 115.4% 
* this averaged over whole period to 
2031 
 
In addition, core homelessness in Scotland would fall by 6,700 in 2031, a fall of 42%.  
When we turn to the key child poverty targets in Scotland, as summarised in Table 18, 
we find that there is strong improvement in all of these and great progress towards 
meeting these targets. In fact, our forecast of persistent poverty suggests that this 
package of policies and economic achievements would pretty well hit this target, while 
for both absolute and combined poverty the achievement would be to get 80% of the 
way to meeting the targets. The relative low income poverty target is always much more 
difficult to meet, as was shown in Bramley et al (2016), because many measures also 
help households in the median area of the income distribution. Thus to get 50% of the 
way to meeting this is quite an achievement.  
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Table 18: Impact of combined favourable scenario on child poverty target 
indicators for families in Scotland by 2031 
Indicator Target Achieved Level Improvement Progress 
Relative Poverty 10.0% 16.5% -6.5% 50% 
Absolute Poverty 5.0% 7.0% -7.0% 78% 
Combined Poverty & 
Material Deprivation 5.0% 6.3% -5.7% 82% 
Persistent poverty  5.0% 5.1% -4.3% 98% 
Looking at the wider pattern across indicators and groups, it is clear that families in 
Scotland would gain a lot against the Minimum Income Standard criteria and in terms of 
severe as well as combined poverty. The positive outcomes of this scenario are 
generally concentrated on working age households, and on quite a few indicators the 
non-family working age households gain (almost) as much as the families do. With the 
relative poverty indicators, a corollary of this strategy is that older retirement age 
households would see some increase in their incidence of relative poverty, while seeing 
relatively little change in those indicators that have a more absolute base. The gains are 
generally greatest for families in social renting, but almost as great for private renters 
(actually greater in certain instances, like the MISGap measure or poverty after housing 
and childcare costs). The absolute gains tend to be highest for working age households 
with no one currently working, for female headed households and younger households 
(under 25).  
Some care is needed in reporting geographical outcomes, particularly for families in 
Scotland, as the sample numbers in UKHLS database are quite small for some regions. 
Nevertheless, it appears that the largest absolute gains in poverty reduction would be in 
Glasgow and Clyde Valley, whereas smaller gains characterise regions which are 
generally more affluent.  
This scenario would have a substantial net fiscal cost, at least in the UK as a whole 
(£12.2bn), due to the substantial enhancement to the generosity of Universal Credit plus 
the childcare package, although the net cost in Scotland seems quite small (£300m), 
because of the much greater enhancement to employment.  
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The distributional outcomes under this combined favourable scenario would see 
significant improvements. So the Gini coefficient for AHC income in Scotland would fall 
by 4.2% (vs 8.1% UK wide), the ratio of the 10th decile to the median would rise by 13% 
and that of the 90th decile to the median would fall by 19%.  
So, this scenario does provide something of a roadmap towards meeting Scotland’s child 
poverty targets, showing that most of the key targets are within striking distance. 
However, this finding does depend on achieving (a) a significantly favourable change in 
the relative and absolute performance of the economy and (b) a significant change of 
direction in relation to welfare and public spending policies, which are predominantly 
determined under the current devolution settlement in Westminster.  
Conclusions 
The models originally developed to address housing and planning issues, and then 
subsequently to inform the JRF strategy to Solve UK Poverty, have been adapted in this 
exercise to address a range of options to help Scotland in trying to meet its re-affirmed 
Child Poverty reduction targets, focussed on the target year of 2030 (in this exercise, 
2031). Some of the suggested policies have not been practical to test through this model 
in the short time available. Some of the suggested policies have been shown to have 
limited if any impact on the poverty targets, for example tax allowances and rates.  
It is important to bear several caveats in mind. Our analysis shows indicative figures for 
fiscal impacts, but these are partial in terms of the range of expenditures and revenues 
counted. Nevertheless these do remind us that not all strategies are net negative (i.e. 
marginal extra spending exceeding marginal extra revenues) and there are considerable 
offsets, even before we get into more indirect social effects and associated cost offsets 
(e.g. health – see for example Bramley, Hirsch and Littlewood, 2016). A further 
complication here is that not all costs and revenues fall in the same jurisdiction under 
the devolution arrangements.  
The policies and scenarios which appear to offer the biggest gains in reducing child 
poverty are: 
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 Raising economic growth and employment rates, allied to increases in workforce 
participation  
 Reversing 2015 cuts in Universal Credit and raising personal allowances 
significantly 
 Increasing work allowances in Universal Credit and reducing the taper 
 A greatly enhanced, more flexible childcare offer 
 Policies/scenarios which appear to achieve relatively smaller gains in terms of 
core child poverty targets for families in Scotland include: 
 Enhanced general housing supply 
 Enhanced social housing supply 
 Private rent re-regulation 
 Full living wage and positive indexation thereof 
 Improved benefit take-up 
 Ending Local Housing Allowance freeze 
The reasons why some of these strategies appear to achieve less are various, but include 
some side effects which not everybody might have anticipated, as well as considerations 
of who the key beneficiaries are and what type of household they are situated in. The 
enhanced housing supply scenarios have less impact on household poverty measures, 
partly because there is significant induced extra household formation by adults who are 
relatively economically marginal. They still achieve a lot in improving affordability and 
access to housing, both owner occupation and social housing, and in reducing housing 
needs and homelessness and their adverse effects. The private rental strategy and 
ending the Local Housing Allowance freeze both have relatively marginal effects, 
particularly in Scotland where rents are not high and tending not to rise much. The 
living wage scenario has rather muted effects because many of the beneficiaries are 
second earners in households who are often not in poverty to start with. Improved 
benefit takeup tends to mainly arise in cases where the benefit entitlement was only 
partial, and the household was not in poverty (so less pressure to claim).  
It is important to underline that government has more direct levers in relation to some 
of these scenarios than others. In particular, it cannot directly determine the growth in 
GDP or its regional distribution. There is increasing emphasis on ‘industrial strategy’ 
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and this includes a focus on regional development, particularly strengthening city 
regions, and this is clearly a good direction for policy. However, the nature, scale and 
magnitude of intervention required to achieve our first scenario, of higher and more 
regionally even economic growth is probably beyond what is currently contemplated in 
Westminster, as well as swimming somewhat against the uncertain tides of Brexit. The 
government can spend directly on improving the generosity of the Universal Credit 
system and publicly-supported childcare and the findings of this study suggest that, if it 
is serious in bearing down on child poverty, it should do so.  
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Outcome Measures Generated by the Model 
 
The potentially relevant housing and labour market outcomes generated by the ‘Stage 1’ 
Sub=Regional Housing Market Model (SRHMM) include the following: 
 Total new housebuilding completions, private and social 
 Household growth [this is endogenous in the model] 
 Social housing relets (turnover supply) 
 Household income 
 Unemployment rate (ILO basis) 
 Employment rate as share of working age population 
 Median house prices 
 Affordability of market housing to buy (percent of younger under-40 households 
able to afford to buy, based on typical lending norms, lower quartile prices, 
estimated local income distributions) 
 Affordability of market housing to rent (percent of younger under-40 households 
able to afford to rent, based on 25% of gross income and median private market 
rent levels by size ) 
 The share of households living in private renting 
 Net new affordable housing need, annual flow 
 Backlog of existing unmet housing needs, (affordability based on 25% of gross 
income and residual income relative to HB applicable amounts; crowding based 
on bedroom standard; concealed households who want/intend to move; sharing 
households; unsuitable dwellings for families with kids or with health 
condition/disability) as a proportion of households 
 Social housing lettings (new+relet) as a percentage of backlog need, interpreted 
as the chances of a household in need being rehoused in the social sector. 
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 Incremental affordability of low cost home ownership (LCHO) schemes, in terms 
of extra percentage of younger households who could afford to buy LCHO but not 
market housing 
We have created summary tables to present the key elements from this list in a succinct 
form for this project, contrasting Scotland and UK.  
The key poverty outcomes modelled and profiled through the micro-simulation are as 
follows (variablename in italic and parentheses; ‘31’ suffix means as forecast for 2031; 
‘u’ suffix means assuming full implementation of Universal Credit): indicators shown in 
bold italic are the four key child poverty targets for Scotland; we focus particularly on 
these in the report below.  
 Low income relative (‘at risk of’) poverty based on net equivalent household 
income being less than 60% of UK median ‘before housing costs’ (BHC) (the old 
child poverty target and EU AROP target) (povbhc31u) 
 Low income relative poverty based on net equivalent income after housing costs 
(AHC) being less than 60% of UK median (povahc31u) 
 Low income absolute poverty based on net equivalent income after housing costs 
(AHC) being less than 60% of UK median in 2011 in real terms, i.e. after adjusting 
for CPI inflation (povabs31) 
 Persistent poverty based on having net equivalent income after housing costs 
(AHC) less than 60% of UK median in three of the last four years (prperspov31, 
predicted value from a logistic regression model fitted to UKHLS data over three 
waves) 
 Household net income after housing costs falls below approx. estimated 
Minimum Income Standard level for household type (failmis31) 
 MIS Gap: average shortfall between household net income and Minimum Income 
Standard level for household type, for those households with a shortfall (i.e 
where failmis31=1), averaged over all households in group (this is a form of 
poverty gap measure) (misgap31) 
 Predicted risk of material deprivation of 3+ essential items (out of 11 included in 
2009-10 UKHLS) (prmd331) 
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 ‘Combined poverty’ based on having net equivalent income AHC less than 
70% of UK median, and having predicted risk of lacking 4+essentials 
greater than 0.5 (prpovcomb431 or altcombpov31) 
 ‘Severe poverty’, based on having net equivalent income AHC less than 40% of 
UK median, and (either having predicted risk of lacking 3+ essentials greater 
than 0.5 or having housing needs relating to affordability, crowding or concealed 
households), and having self-reported difficulty with /falling behind with 
payments relating to housing rent/mortgage, utilities or Council Tax 
(altsevpov31) 
 Predicted level of ‘Financial difficulty’, defined as having self-reported difficulty 
with /falling behind with payments relating to housing rent/mortgage, utilities 
or Council Tax (prfindiff31) 
 Having selected housing needs relating to affordability, crowding or concealed 
households (anyneed3)  
 Number of children in workless households per total household (a Government 
target) (nkids_wrkless)  
 ‘Core homelessness’, based on ongoing Crisis research (Bramley 2017), predicted 
number of households sleeping rough or in similar situations, staying in 
homeless hostels, in unsuitable temporary accommodation, or ‘sofa surfing’.  
